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Abstract
We ask whether epidemic exposure leads to a shift in financial technology usage and
who participates in this shift. We exploit a dataset combining Gallup World Polls and
Global Findex surveys for some 250,000 individuals in 140 countries, merging them with
information on the incidence of epidemics and local 3G internet infrastructure. Epi-
demic exposure is associated with an increase in remote-access (online/mobile) banking
and substitution from bank branch-based to ATM activity. Heterogeneity in response
centers on the age, income and employment of respondents. Young, high-income earn-
ers in full-time employment have the greatest tendency to shift to online/mobile trans-
actions in response to epidemics. These effects are larger for individuals with better ex
ante 3G signal coverage, highlighting the role of the digital divide in adaption to new
technologies necessitated by adverse external shocks.
JEL classification: G20, G59, I10.
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1. Introduction
Epidemics are frequently cited as inducing changes in economic behavior and accelerat-
ing technological and behavioral trends. The Black Death, the mother of all epidemics,
is thought to have sped the adoption of earlier capital-intensive agricultural technologies
such as the heavy plow and water mill by inducing substitution of capital for more expen-
sive labor (Senn, 2003; Pelham, 2017). COVID-19, a more recent example, is said to
have increased remote working (Brenan, 2020), online shopping (Grashuis, Skevas, and
Segovia, 2020), and telehealth (Richardson, Aissat, Williams, Fahy, et al., 2020).
But there can be important differences across socioeconomic groups in ability to utilize
such new technologies.1 In the case of COVID, high-tech workers and individuals in the
professions have been better able to shift to remote work, compared to store clerks, home
health-care assistants, custodians and other less well-paid individuals (Saad and Jones,
2021). Women have had more difficulty capitalizing on opportunities to work remotely
given the occupations in which they are specialized (Coury, Huang, Kumar, Prince,
Krikovich, and Yee, 2020). Older individuals, being less technologically savvy, often find
it harder to adjust to new work modalities (Farrell, 2020). Small firms with limited tech-
nological capability have been less able to adapt their business models and stay competitive,
while residents of areas with limited broadband have experienced less scope for moving to
remote work, remote schooling and telehealth (Chiou and Tucker, 2020; Georgieva,
2020; Ramsetty and Adams, 2020). COVID-19, it is said, accelerated ongoing trends
(OECD, 2020; Citigroup, 2020). If increasing prevalence of the so-called digital divide
was an ongoing trend before COVID, then the pandemic may have accelerated this one in
particular.
We study these issues in the context of fintech adoption and usage.2 Specifically, we ask
whether past epidemics induced a shift toward remote-access financial technologies such as
online banking and ATMs, and away from traditional brick-and-mortar bank branches. We
combine data on epidemics worldwide with nationally representative Global Findex surveys
of individual financial behavior fielded in more than 140 countries in 2011, 2014 and 2017.
Matching each individual in Global Findex dataset to detailed background information about
1Thus, to continue with the case of the Black Death, Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2011) argue
that the plough, which requires strength and eliminates the need for weeding, favored male relative to female
labor and generated a preference for fewer children, ultimately reducing fertility.
2We interchangeably use the terms “fintech adoption” and “fintech usage” throughout the paper. As
will be clear later, our measures of financial technology adoption and usage at the individual level are binary
variables and thus cannot speak to the intensive margin of fintech access (i.e., how much a technology is
used by an individual). In a sense, construction of variables based solely on the extensive margin is more in
line with the notion of fintech adoption rather than fintech usage.
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the same individual in Gallup World Polls allows us to control for socioeconomic factors at
a granular level.
Holding constant individual-level economic and demographic characteristics and coun-
try and year fixed effects, we find that contemporaneous epidemic exposure increases the
likelihood that individuals transact via the internet and mobile bank accounts, make online
payments using the internet, and complete account transactions using an ATM instead of
with a teller at a bank branch. Separate impacts on ATM and in-branch transactions almost
exactly offset. This suggests that epidemic exposure mainly affects the form of banking
activity – digital or in person – without increasing or reducing its volume or extent as il-
lustrated later by the placebo questions that we exploit. The limited time span covered by
our data allows for only a tentative analysis of persistence, but our results suggest that the
impact of epidemic exposure is felt mainly in the short run rather than persistently over
time.
Sensitivity analyses support these findings. The results continue to obtain when we ad-
just for multiple outcomes (Anderson, 2008). A test following Oster (2019) confirms
that our treatment effects are unlikely to be driven by omitted factors. We document the
existence of parallel trends before epidemic events, present balance tests across epidemic and
non-epidemic countries, report null effects on placebo outcomes, analyze epidemic intensity,
implement alternative clustering techniques for standard errors, control for country-specific
time trends, drop influential treatment observations from the sample, and randomize treat-
ment countries and/or years. None of these extensions changes our results or interpretation.
Using the data-driven approach suggested by Athey and Imbens (2016), we then
identify the key heterogeneities in our treatment effects. These are documented as individual
income, employment and age. It is mainly young, high earners in full-time employment who
take up online/mobile transactions in response to epidemics, in other words. These patterns
are consistent with other research on early adopters of similar digital technologies (Chau
and Hui, 1998; Dedehayir, Ortt, Riverola, and Miralles, 2017).
Last but not least, we highlight the importance of the digital divide by investigating the
role of local internet infrastructure in conditioning the shift toward online banking. We match
1km-by-1km time-varying data on global 3G internet coverage from Collins Bartholomew’s
Mobile Coverage Explorer to the sub-national region in which each individual surveyed by
Findex-Gallup resides. We find that individuals with better ex ante internet coverage are
more likely to shift toward online banking in response to an epidemic. This finding still ob-
tains when we employ a specification with country-by-year fixed effects that absorb all types
of country-level variation in our sample, including the incidence of epidemics. Importantly,
we fail to find any consistent effect for GSM (Global System for Mobile Communication, or
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2G, the older radio system used in cellphones, which only allows phone calls and sending
text messages) when this is included side by side with our 3G measure, confirming that the
relevant technology is related to the internet and not to overall mobile phone usage.
In sum, we find strong evidence of epidemic-induced changes in economic and financial
behavior, of differences in the extent of such shifts by more and less economically advantaged
individuals, and of a role for digital infrastructure in spreading or limiting the benefits
of technological alternatives. The results thus highlight both the behavioral response to
epidemics and the digital divide.
Online and mobile banking is a particularly informative context for studying the broader
question of whether past epidemics induced the adoption of new technologies and, if so, by
whom and where. Individuals in a variety of different countries and settings have available
banking options that involve both in-person contact (such as banking via tellers in bank
branches of a sort that may be problematic during an epidemic) and digital alternatives (such
as banking via the internet or mobile phone app); these alternatives have been available for
some time. Analogous studies of telehealth would face the obstacle that physicians’ offices in
many countries and settings did not, at the time of epidemic exposure, possess the capacity
to provide such services remotely. Similarly, studies of remote schooling in the context of
past epidemics would be limited by the fact that few schools and homes had available a
flexible video conferencing technology, such as Zoom, much less the reliable internet needed
to operate it.
Due to data availability, the time dimension in our analysis is restricted to the years of
2011, 2014 and 2017. This prevents us from tracing the effects of a specific epidemic event
over consecutive periods. Subject to this caveat, we compare outcomes across countries
struck and not struck by epidemic events in the past or similary due to be struck in the
future. None of these comparions generate significant differences. This finding is consistent
with the parallel-trends assumption necessary for a causal interpretation of our difference-in-
differences results. It also implies a contemprenous response to an epidemic event but little
if any persistence.
Online and mobile banking, as well as branch vs ATM activities, are informative contexts
for studying the broader question of whether past epidemics encouraged the adoption and
use of new financial technologies and, if so, by whom and where. Individuals in a variety of
different countries and settings have available banking options that involve both in-person
contact (such as banking via tellers in bank branches) and remote-access alternatives (such
as banking via the internet or mobile phone app); these alternatives have been available for
some time. Analogous studies of telehealth would face the obstacle that physicians’ offices
in many countries and settings did not, at the time of epidemic exposure, have the capacity
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to provide such services remotely. Similarly, studies of remote schooling in the context of
past epidemics would be limited by the fact that few schools and homes had available a
flexible video conferencing technology, such as Zoom, much less the reliable internet needed
to operate it.
Banking is different in that the diffusion and use of ATMs and online banking have been
underway since the 1990s. Individuals have been using ATMs, computers and smartphones
for banking applications for years. Thus, insofar as epidemic exposure induces changes in
behavior, these are likely to be more evident in this context than others. Moreover, the fact
that in-person and remote banking activities already existed side-by-side makes it more likely
that the access to new technologies during epidemics operates through changing individuals’
variable cost-benefit calculations, and less likely that individuals have to sink a fixed cost
(learning for the first time how to use an ATM or a smartphone-enabled banking app) in
order to suddenly avoid in-person contact. Similarly, that individuals using remote-access
alternatives are already familiar with in-person banking plausibly makes it more likely that
the behaviour shift may be reversed in the future (that the epidemic-induced change is not
persistent), which is what we observe in the data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Sections 3
and 4 then describe our data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results,
including for within-sample heterogeneity, persistence of the effects and the role of 3G infras-
tructure. Section 6 summarizes our additional robustness checks, after which Section 7
concludes. The appendix (available online) presents further detail on our data and additional
empirical results.
2. Related Literature
Our paper is related to several literatures. First, there is a literature on the impact of
digital technologies on financial behavior. For example, D’Andrea and Limodio (2019)
analyze the rollout of submarine fiber-optic cables and associated access to high-speed inter-
net in Africa, showing that access to high-speed internet promoted more efficient liquidity
management by banks due to enhanced access to the interbank market, resulting in more
lending to the private sector and greater use of credit by firms. Muralidharan, Niehaus,
and Sukhtankar (2016) and Aker, Boumnijel, McClelland, and Tierney (2016)
find that biometric smart cards and mobile money systems facilitate governmental efforts
to distribute employment and pension benefits. Bachas, Gertler, Higgins, and Seira
(2018) find that debit cards, by reducing the difficulty of accessing and utilizing bank ser-
vices, foster financial inclusion. Callen, De Mel, McIntosh, and Woodruff (2019) show
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that mobile point-of-service terminals improves savings options, in turn alleviating extreme
poverty, encouraging self-employment, and raising wages. Jack and Suri (2014) similarly
find that access to mobile money enhances risk-sharing and smooths consumption, in their
context by improving access to remittances. Digital payments that connect individuals with
banks, employees, and suppliers encourage entrepreneurship (Klapper, 2017), while ability
to conduct financial transactions by mobile phone reduces urban-rural inequality by facilitat-
ing money transfer between urban and rural members of extended families (Lee, Morduch,
Ravindran, Shonchoy, and Zaman, 2021). We contribute to this literature by show-
ing that when social distancing becomes a necessity, access to digital financial technology
helps individuals to continue financial activities by switching from in-person to remote-access
options.
A sub-literature focuses on differential adoption of online, mobile and e-banking. Some
studies examine the role of social influences, such as the practices of friends and family
(Al-Somali, Gholami, and Clegg, 2009; Baptista and Oliveira, 2015; Tarhini,
El-Masri, Ali, and Serrano, 2016). Chen, Doerr, Frost, Gambacorta, and Shin
(2021) identify a pervasive male-female gap in fintech adoption, pointing to social norms,
as well as possible differences in preferences and gender-based discrimination, as potential
explanations for slower adoption by women. Other studies focus on levels of trust, defined as
the belief that others will not behave opportunistically in the digital sphere (Gu, Lee, and
Suh, 2009). Finally, studies such as Breza, Kanz, and Klapper (2020) and Klapper
(2020) find that information about the utility and security of online and mobile banking,
obtained via first-hand experience or independent sources, is conducive to wider utilization.
Our paper adds to this literature by showing how national health emergencies shape usage
of such technologies, and by documenting the existence of digital divides between economic
and demographic subgroups, defined by age, income and employment.
A number of recent papers study the take-up and effects of financial technologies in the
context of COVID-19. Kwan, Lin, Pursiainen, and Tai (2021) examine the relationship
between banks’ IT capacity and ability to serve customers during the recent pandemic;
using U.S. data, they show that banks with better IT capabilities saw larger reductions in
physical branch visits and larger increases in website traffic, consistent with a shift to digital
banking. In addition, they find that banks possessing more advanced IT originated more
small business Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. Core and De Marco (2021)
examine small business lending in Italy during COVID-19 and similarly find that banks with
more sophisticated IT were better able to distribute government-guaranteed loans. Erel
and Liebersohn (2020), again in the context of PPP lending, find that borrowers obtained
these loans primarily from banks in zip codes with more bank branches, higher incomes and
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smaller minority shares of the population, but from fintechs in places with fewer banks, lower
incomes and more minorities. Comparing zip codes with more and fewer bank branches, they
find limited substitution from fintech to bank borrowing, as if fintech presence leads mainly
to an increase in the overall supply of financial services (greater financial inclusion), not just
reallocation from banks to fintechs. Fu and Mishra (2020) show that the COVID-19 virus
and government-ordered lockdowns increased downloads of banking-related apps. We extend
these findings to past epidemics and a larger set of countries, as well as providing evidence
not just for the adoption of new technologies but also for the abandonment of old ones (i.e.,
reduced bank branch usage relative to ATMs). Our setting also allows us to consider possible
long-term impacts of epidemics, as opposed to focusing only on contemporaneous effects.
Finally, there is the literature on the digital divide. WorldBank (2016) emphasizes that
the benefits of new digital technologies are unevenly distributed owing to lack of high-speed
internet in developing countries and regions. Chiou and Tucker (2020) show that the
availability of high-speed internet significantly affected the ability of individuals to self-isolate
during the COVID-19 pandemic. UNCTAD (2020) documents that lack of internet access
limits scope for shifting to remote schooling in developing countries; McKenzie (2021)
finds similar patterns for underserved areas in the United States. We contribute to this
literature by showing that lack of 3G coverage slowed the adoption of online and mobile
financial technologies in past epidemic outbreaks.
3. Data
Our analysis combines data from several sources. First, we use Findex to measure financial
behavior in more than 140 countries and Gallup World Polls (GWP) for data on house-
hold characteristics, income, and financial situation. We merge Findex with GWP using
individual identifiers, giving us household-level data on financial technology adoption and
its correlates. We then use the epidemic dataset of Ma, Rogers, and Zhou (2020) to de-
termine whether a country experienced an epidemic in a given year. We complement these
data with information on country-level time-varying indicators (such as the level of eco-
nomic and financial development, as proxied by GDP per capita and bank deposits over
GDP) taken from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database. Finally, using
Collins Bartholomew’s Mobile Coverage Explorer, we add global 3G internet access, which
we observe at the 1km-by-1km level. We aggregate these data to the sub-national locations
identified for each respondent by GWP.
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3.1. Findex
Findex is a nationally representative survey fielded in some 140 countries in 2011, 2014, and
2017 (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012, 2013). This provides information on saving,
borrowing, payments and use of financial technology, including mobile phones and/or the
internet usage to conduct financial transactions. These data are collected in partnership
with Gallup through nationally representative surveys of more than 150,000 adults in each
wave. We focus on individuals aged 18 and older to ensure that those in our sample are
eligible for a bank account.
The outcome variables of interest come from questions asked of all Findex respondents
regarding their use of fintech and other regular financial services:
1. Online/Mobile transactions using the internet and bank account: In the PAST 12
MONTHS, have you made a transaction online using the Internet as well as with
money FROM YOUR ACCOUNT at a bank or another type of formal financial insti-
tution using a MOBILE PHONE? This can include using a MOBILE PHONE to make
payments, buy things, or to send or receive money.
2. Mobile transaction using bank account: In the PAST 12 MONTHS, have you ever
made a transaction with money FROM YOUR ACCOUNT at a bank or another type
of formal financial institution using a MOBILE PHONE? This can include using a
MOBILE PHONE to make payments, buy things, or to send or receive money.
3. Online payments (such as bills) using the internet: In the PAST 12 MONTHS, have
you, personally, made payments on bills or bought things online using the Internet?
4. Withdrawals using ATM: When you need to get cash (paper or coins) from your ac-
count(s), do you usually get it at an ATM?
5. Withdrawals using a bank branch: When you need to get cash (paper or coins) from
your account(s), do you usually get it over the counter in a branch of your bank or
financial institution?
Responses were coded on a 2-point scale: “Yes” (1) to “No” (2). Note that the last two
questions above (related to ATM and branch withdrawals) come from a single question with
various alternatives; thus responses to these questions are mutually exclusive.
Linking Findex to Gallup World Polls, we obtain information on respondents’ demo-
graphic characteristics (age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, religion, and
urban/rural residence), exact income level, labor market status, and within-country income
deciles as a proxy for social status.
We also examine responses to five parallel questions as placebo outcomes:
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6. Account ownership: An account can be used to save money, to make or receive pay-
ments, or to receive wages or financial help. Do you, either by yourself or together with
someone else, currently have an account at a bank or another type of formal financial
institution?
7. Deposit money into a personal account in a typical month: In a typical MONTH, is any
money DEPOSITED into your personal account(s): This includes cash or electronic
deposits, or any time money is put into your account(s) by yourself or others.
8. Withdraw money out of a personal account in a typical month: In a typical MONTH,
is any money WITHDRAWN from your personal account(s): This includes cash with-
drawals in person or using your (insert local terminology for ATM/debit card), elec-
tronic payments or purchases, checks, or any other time money is removed from your
account(s) by yourself or another person or institution.
9. Debit card ownership: A/An (local terminology for ATM/debit card) is a card con-
nected to an account at a financial institution that allows you to withdraw money, and
the money is taken out of THAT ACCOUNT right away. Do you, personally, have
a/an (local terminology for ATM/debit card)?
10. Credit card ownership: A credit card is a card that allows you to BORROW money in
order to make payments or buy things, and you can pay the balance off later. Do you,
personally, have a credit card?
These last responses help us to determine whether what we are capturing is the impact of
epidemic exposure on financial technology specifically, as distinct from its impact on financial
services-related outcomes generally.
3.2. Ma et al. Epidemic Database
Data on worldwide large-scale epidemics are drawn from Ma et al., who construct a country-
panel dataset from the turn of the century. The authors focus on the five pandemic waves
originally identified by Jamison, Gelband, and Horton (2017): SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009,
MERS in 2012, Ebola in 2014 and Zika in 2016. They date epidemic events in each country
by using announcement dates from the World Health Organisation. Almost all countries in
the world were affected by post-millennial epidemics at one time or another according to
their list.3
The Ma et al. dataset does not contain country-specific intensity measures and must
therefore be used in dichotomous form. This binary measure is consistent with the assump-
3The authors enumerate 290 country-year pandemic/epidemic observations since the turn of the century.
See Online Appendix B for the detailed list.
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tion of the exogeneity of our treatment, since occurrence of an epidemic (as opposed to its
intensity) is likely to be uncorrelated with country characteristics.4 Nonetheless, we also
analyze more and less severe epidemics separately by constructing dummy variables based
on the above/below median infection cases (or deaths) per capita across all epidemics during
our sample period for which we manually collect the information from Emergency Events
(EM-DAT, 2021) database of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters and
supplementary sources. We merge these data with the Findex-Gallup database.
3.3. Global 3G/2G Coverage
Collins Bartholomew’s Mobile Coverage Explorer provides information on signal coverage
at a 1-by-1 kilometer grid-level around the world. To calculate the share of the population
covered by 3G, we use 1-by-1 kilometer population data from the Gridded Population of
the World for 2015, distributed by the Center for International Earth Science Information
Network.5 We then calculate the share of a district’s territory covered by 3G networks in a
given year, weighted by population density at each point on the map. We first calculate each
grid’s population coverage and then aggregate this information over the sub-national regions
distinguished by GWP. We use this population-weighted 3G network coverage variable to
capture 3G mobile internet access at the sub-regional level. We adopt the same approach
when calculating 2G network coverage, which enables mobile phone use but not internet
access.
Appendix Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the outcome and placebo variables,
epidemic occurrence, and 3G internet coverage.
4. Empirical Strategy
To assess the causal effect of past epidemic exposure on an individual’s usage of digital and
traditional financial services, we estimate a linear probability model with a difference-in-
differences specification:
Yi,c,t = β1ExposureToEpidemicc,t + β2Xi,c,t + β3Cc + β4Tt + εi,c,t (1)
where Yi,c,t is a dummy variable indicating whether or not respondent i in country c in year t
uses digital or traditional financial services. “Exposure to epidemic” is an indicator variable
4In other words, countries may be hit randomly by an epidemic, as the result of exposure to an infected
international traveler for instance, but how widely the infection spreads will depend on the strength of its
health system, its economic resources, and other country characteristics.
5The data are publicly available at: http://www.ciesin.org/.
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capturing whether a country experienced an epidemic in a year during our sample period.
The coefficient of interest is β1. As noted, our identification assumption is that occurrence
of an epidemic (as opposed to its intensity) is uncorrelated with country-level characteristics
and hence that our treatment variable is plausibly exogenous.6
To control for the effects of demographic and labor market structure, we include the
following in the Xi,c,t vector of individual characteristics: individual income (in level and
squared), and indicator variables for living in an urban area, having a child (any child
under 15), gender (male), employment status (full-time employed, part-time employed, un-
employed), religion (atheist, orthodox, protestant, catholic, muslim), educational attainment
(tertiary education, secondary education), and within-country-year income decile.
To account for unobservable characteristics, we include fixed effects at the levels of coun-
try (Cc) and year (Tt). The country dummies control for all variation in the outcome variable
due to factors that vary only cross-nationally. These also strengthen our identification argu-
ment, ensuring that we control for the selection of certain countries into epidemic episodes as
long as the timing of the epidemic can be considered exogenous.7 The year dummies control
for global shocks that affect all countries simultaneously. We also include as country-level
time-varying regressors GDP per capita and bank deposits relative to GDP; these variables
capture economic and financial development across countries and over time.
In further robustness checks we add interactive country-times-income decile, country-
times-labor-market status, and country-times-education fixed effects. These interaction
terms allow us to compare the treatment and control groups within those specific cate-
gorical bins. We cluster standard errors by country, and use sampling weights provided by
Findex-Gallup to make the data representative at the country level.
5. Main Results
The five rows of Table 1 show results for five outcome variables: whether an individual
(i) engages in online transactions using both the internet and his or her bank account,
including by mobile phone, (ii) engages in mobile transactions using a bank account, (iii)
makes online payments using the internet, (iv) makes withdrawals using an ATM, and (v)
makes withdrawals over the counter at a bank branch. The five columns, moving left to
6In Appendix Tables 5 and 6, we show that the occurrence of epidemics is indeed uncorrelated with
country-level characteristics.
7For instance, an African country may generally be more likely to experience epidemics compared to a
European country. In a fixed-effect setting, our identification strategy is likely to hold as long as one could
think of the (within-country) timing of an epidemic as unpredictable (i.e., exogenous).
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right, report regressions with increasingly comprehensive sets of controls.8
Exposure to an epidemic in the current year significantly increases the likelihood that a
respondent will have engaged in online transactions. This result obtains for multiple remote-
access banking transactions. In particular, epidemic exposure in the current year increases
the likelihood that an individual will have made a withdrawal using an ATM while reducing
the likelihood of doing so at a bank branch (in person over the counter). These last two
coefficients are opposite in sign and roughly equal in magnitude, suggesting that there is
near-perfect substitution between ATM-based transactions and those undertaken in-person
at bank branches.9 In our preferred model (Column 5), exposure to an epidemic leads to 10.6
(4.5) percentage point increase in online/mobile transactions using the internet and bank
account (mobile transaction using bank account). Given that the means of these outcome
variables are 8.3 (9.4) percent, the effect is sizeable.
These results are robust to including individual-level income (linear and non-linear),
demographic characteristics, labor market controls, education fixed effects, (within-country)
income decile fixed effects, and year fixed effects. They are robust to including time-varying
country-level controls (GDP per capita and bank deposits over GDP) and country fixed
effects or, alternatively, country by education, country by labor market status and country by
income decile status fixed effects, saturating our specification so as to restrict the dependent
variable to vary only within these bins.
We follow the method proposed by Oster (2019) to investigate the importance of unob-
servables.10 For each panel of Table 1, the final column reports Oster’s delta for our main
model. This indicates the degree of selection on economic unobservables, relative to observ-
ables, needed for our results to be fully explained by omitted variable bias. The high delta
values (between 10 and 52 depending on the outcome) are reassuring: given the economic
controls in our models, it seems unlikely that unobserved factors are 10 to 52 times more
important than the observables included in our preferred specification.
Because we analyze multiple outcomes, and because this could generate false positives
8Sample size varies across specifications because we drop singleton observations that are perfectly
collinear with our fixed effects.
9As previously noted, these two questions on cash withdrawals (ATM vs. bank branch) are originally
asked in a mutually exclusive manner (alongside a few other options) in the Findex questionnaire. This is
in line with our interpretation of the related results as a “substitution” from one technology to another.
10Estimation bounds on the treatment effect range between the coefficient from the main specification
and the coefficient estimated under the null assumption that unobservables are as important as observables
for the level of Rmax. Rmax specifies the maximum R-squared that can be achieved if all unobservables
were included in the regression. Oster (2019) uses a sample of 65 RCT papers to estimate an upper bound of
the R-squared such that 90 percent of the results would be robust to omitted variables bias. This estimation
strategy yields an upper bound for the R-squared, Rmax, that is 1.3 times the R-squared in specifications
that control for observables. The rule of thumb to be able to argue that unobservables cannot fully explain
the treatment effect is for Oster’s delta to be greater than one.
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purely by chance, we follow Anderson (2008) in computing false discovery rates (FDRs),
which calculate the expected proportion of rejections that are type I errors and generate an
adjusted p-value (i.e., sharpened q-value) for each corresponding estimate. As seen beneath
each estimate (in brackets) in Table 1, findings do not change when we employ this method;
in fact the statistical significance of the estimates based on these adjusted p-values is usually
higher than those indicated by standard p-values.
We also considered placebo tests – tests for changes in financial behaviors other than
the choice between in-person and remote-access transactions. The additional dependent
variables here are whether the individual (i) owns an account, (ii) deposited money into a
personal account in a typical month (either in person or online), (iii) withdrew money from a
personal account in a typical month (either in person or online), (iv) owned a debit card, and
(v) owned a credit card. The results, in Table 2, are reassuring. They show insignificant
effects, small coefficients and no uniform pattern of signs. An interpretation is that epidemic
exposure affects the form – remote access or in person – of financial activity but not its level,
and that it has no obvious impact on financial inclusion.11
5.1. Heterogeneity
To identify heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of individuals in our sample,
we use a Causal Forest methodology (Athey and Imbens, 2016). We build regression
trees that split the control variable space into increasingly smaller subsets. Regression trees
aim to predict an outcome variable by building on the mean outcome of observations with
similar characteristics. When a variable has little predictive power, it is assigned a negative
importance score, which is equivalent to low importance for treatment heterogeneity. Causal
Forest estimation combines such regression trees to identify treatment effects, where each
tree is defined by different orders and subsets of covariates. Figure 1.A presents the result
based on 20,000 regression trees, where we set the threshold as 0.15 and above.
Here household income, employment, and age are the important dimensions of treatment
heterogeneity. We therefore re-estimate our main specification (Column 5 in Table 1)
restricting the sample to each categorical domain. Results are in Figures 1.B, 1.C and
1.D. The average treatment effect is driven by individuals with annual incomes above $10,000
U.S., young adults (ages 26 to 34), and those in full-time employment at the time of the
epidemic. It makes sense that better off, more economically secure and younger individuals
11Even though we cannot rule out a positive impact of 2-3% on account and debit card ownership due to
large estimated confidence intervals, coefficient sizes are sufficiently small to reject an economically mean-
ingful increase. According to Appendix Table 1, such increase would correspond to around 5% of the sample
mean of these two outcome variables whereas the estimated effect on online/mobile transactions corresponds
to more than 100% of the sample mean.
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should be more inclined to switch to new financial technologies. Technology adoption in
general declines with age (Friedberg, 2003; Schleife, 2006), while less-well-off individuals
often have less exposure or access to such technology.
5.2. Event Study Estimates and Persistence
Because Findex is only available for three cross-sections spanning seven years, any inves-
tigation of persistence is necessarily tentative. As a start, we employ the specification in
Equation 1 but redefine the treatment variable to indicate individuals in countries exposed
to an epidemic in the year immediately preceding the survey, and in a separate estimation as
indicating individuals exposed to an epidemic two years prior to the survey.12 To investigate
pre-existing trends in the outcomes of interest, we also tested for changes in behavior in
years prior to the exposure.
Figure 2 reports the coefficients for these treatment variables generated via separate
regressions on the same sample of individuals.13 Panel A shows that differences between
countries exposed to an epidemic in the past (or struck by one in the future) and those that
were not so affected are small and statistically insignificant. These event-study graphs are
consistent with the idea that the epidemic shock was exogenous with respect to banking
activity (i.e. that our estimates satisfy the parallel trends assumption). Nor does it appear
from this analysis that the change in behavior persists beyond the epidemic year.
These results can be interpreted in terms of a model of high fixed costs of learning about
electronic banking and low variable costs, once those fixed costs have been sunk, of switching
between in-person and electronic modalities. Intuitively, an individual already familiar with
banking both via a teller and using a smartphone, having earlier sunk the costs of learning
about the latter, can easily switch to banking entirely with his/her smartphone in response to
an epidemic outbreak, but equally well shift back to doing some or all of his/her transactions
with a teller, as is convenient, once the outbreak is over. In contrast, an individual who does
all his transactions with a teller at a bank branch and possesses no smartphone (or no
familiarity with the relevant banking app) may choose to invest in the latter and shift to
banking electronically in response to the shock of a major epidemic outbreak and then,
having sunk those costs, continue to bank electronically to a greater extent than before once
12We are careful not to overinterpret this result, since past epidemics may not necessarily represent the
same events as the ones captured by our contemporaneous treatment dummy. Therefore, failing to find an
effect in this setting does not automatically translate to a short-term impact for the epidemic episodes that
we capture with our contemporaneous epidemic variable. To the extent that treatment effects might be
heterogenous across different types of epidemics in our sample, this type of analysis should be interpreted
with caution.
13Some coefficients in Figure 2 cannot be estimated due to lack of variation in the corresponding treatment
variable and are thus denoted as zeros.
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the epidemic event is over. The lack of persistent effects in our data thus suggests that many
individuals in our sample had already familiarized themselves with ATMs and online and/or
cellphone-enabled banking in the 2011-2017 period covered by our data. That switching
from in-person to remote-access banking occurs disproportionately among relatively young
(as well as affluent and fully employed) individuals who are presumably already familiar with
both modalities is further consistent with this observation.
5.3. Role of Infrastructure
Infrastructure weaknesses may hinder digital transactions and limit epidemic-induced shift in
behavior (as suggested by studies cited in Section 2). We therefore add to our specification a
measure of within-country subregional 3G coverage. 3G is indeed the relevant technological
threshold, since 2G allows only for mobile phone calls and text messages but not internet
browsing.14
Our 3G variable captures the population-weighted portion of 1x1 km squares with a 3G
connection in each subregion distinguished by Gallup. We interact it with our measure of
epidemic exposure and also include it separately to control for any first-order effect of mobile
internet coverage. Appendix Figure 1 provides a visual summary of 3G mobile internet
expansion around the world between 2011 and 2017. There is substantial variation within
and between countries in 3G coverage and how it changes over time.
We initially treat 3G availability as exogenous, since the technology was licensed and
deployed to facilitate calls, texts, and internet browsing and not because of online bank-
ing availability. Nonetheless, to address the concern that causality may run from banking
provision to 3G coverage, we include additional dummies for each country-year pair. Since
banks usually provide very similar online banking services throughout a country, this non-
parametrically controls for supply-related factors. It focuses instead on within-country-year
variation in online banking that is more likely to be driven by demand-related shocks. This
also ensures that our estimates are also not driven by any country-specific time-varying
unobservables.
A further concern is that epidemics may lead to changes in 3G coverage, for example via
signal failures if the maintenance of local services is adversely affected by the public health
emergency.15 We follow two strategies to limit the danger that subregional 3G coverage is
affected by epidemics. First, we minimize the variation in 3G coverage by specifying it in
binary form, where above-median values take the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. So long as
14In Appendix Table 7, we confirm that 2G internet access has no impact on our outcomes when it is
interacted with epidemic exposure.
15This would result in multicollinearity in our estimates.
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a region does not experience a very large change in coverage in response to an epidemic –
so long as it does not jump from one category to another – this will minimize endogeneity.
Second, we eliminate time variation in the 3G variable by only using the initial (2011) values
for each subregion.
Table 3 shows the result for online transactions using the internet and the individual’s
bank account, including by mobile phone. 3G coverage has little effect: its coefficient is small
and statistically significant only when we exclude individual controls. But when interacted
with epidemic exposure, its effect is large and statistically significant at conventional confi-
dence levels. Again, these results survive the Oster test for potential omitted variable bias
and when we adjust the p-values for multiple models. According to the most conservative
regression, including both the baseline and interacted coefficients (Column 5, middle panel),
the impact of epidemic exposure on the propensity to transact using the internet is more
than twice as large with 3G coverage. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that there is no evidence of
the additional effect of 3G infrastructure persisting beyond the period of epidemic exposure,
nor of the effect emerging prior to the epidemic shock.16
6. Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks
6.1. Are more intense epidemics different?
We can re-estimate our model with separate binary treatment indicators for high and low
intensity epidemics. We calculate the number of people (as a share of the population) infected
in each epidemic event by manually collecting the relevant data from EM-DAT database and
supplementary sources and use the median value as our threshold. Appendix Table 2
shows that treatment effects tend to be larger for high intensity epidemics, in line with the
idea that individuals are more likely to switch to remote banking in response to more serious
epidemic-induced health risks.17
6.2. Robustness to alternative levels of clustering
We can also establish the robustness of our results under alternative assumptions about the
variance-covariance matrix. In our main specification, we cluster the standard errors at the
country level. Results are robust to instead clustering at global region-year level (12 units
16Again, this means that our setting satisfies the parallel trends assumption.
17The results are qualitatively the same when we use epidemic-induced death numbers instead of infection
cases as a threshold to decide on the low/high intensity epidemics.
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x 3 years; assuming that residuals co-move within these units) and clustering only at global
region level (12 units) as reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 3.
6.3. Country-specific time trends
Controlling for country-specific linear time trends allows us to remove distinctive trends
in fintech adoption in individual countries that might otherwise bias our estimates if they
accidentally coincided with other epidemic-related changes. The results remain robust (see
Column 3 of Appendix Table 3)
6.4. Falsification
We conduct two falsification exercises by creating placebo treatment variables. In the first,
we keep the same epidemic year for a given epidemic event but randomly choose a different
country from the same continent as the country where the epidemic actually took place.
For instance, the Ebola pandemic in 2014 had a particularly devastating impact on African
countries such as Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia, raising the possibility that something
else distinctive to Africa may be driving our estimates. But when we randomly assign the
epidemic events to other unaffected countries (instead of the affected country) in the same
continent while still keeping the same epidemic year, our estimates (Column 1 of Appendix
Table 4) are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Alternatively, we randomize both the epidemic country and the year for each epidemic
event. Again, the results (Column 2 of Appendix Table 4) confirm that the potential
geographical clustering of epidemic events in the same continent does not drive our results.
Financial technology adoption occurs only in countries actually affected by the epidemic
event, but not in countries with similar geographies that were not stricken by an epidemic.
6.5. Balance test
Our identification assumption is that the occurrence/start of an epidemic is uncorrelated
with country characteristics and hence that our treatment variable is plausibly exogenous.
We provide direct evidence on this in Appendix Tables 5 and 6. In particular, we estimate
the following country-year level specification in Appendix Table 5:
ExposureToEpidemicc,t = β1Xc,t + β2Cc + β3Tt + εc,t (2)
“Exposure to epidemic” is an indicator variable capturing whether a country experienced
an epidemic in a year (i.e., our treatment variable in Equation 1). Xc,t refers to country level
16
covariates, which include GDP per capita (in constant 2010 US dollars), urban population as
a share of total population, and other variables (such as ATMs per 100,000 adults and bank
net interest margin) that measure a country’s level of the financial development. We include
country and year fixed effects throughout and further saturate the models with continent
by year fixed effects and country income group (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-
income countries) fixed effects. We estimate standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity.
Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 5 present results from a country-year level analysis
between 2000 and 2017 and Columns 3 and 4 present results from a country-year level analysis
for 2011, 2014 and 2017 (i.e., Findex survey years). Reassuringly, none of the country-level
covariates we include in the analysis is correlated with epidemic occurrence.
Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 6 further show that occurrence of an epidemic is
also not correlated with changes in country-level characteristics (i.e., all the covariates are
based on changes between 2000 and 2017). Finally, Columns 3 and 4 show that country
characteristics at baseline are not correlated with the occurrence of an epidemic (i.e., all
explanatory variables are measured in 2011).
The results presented in Appendix Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the assumption
that the occurrence of epidemics is plausibly exogenous to country-level characteristics.
6.6. 2G coverage as a placebo treatment
There may be concern that the 3G variable is endogenous and captures other subregional
characteristics (economic wealth, economic growth, etc.) and not just internet infrastruc-
ture. This would lead us to incorrectly attribute the effects reported in Table 3 to 3G
rather than the unobserved characteristic. However, similar concerns could be raised for an
alternative variable capturing previous-generation mobile networks (i.e., 2G) that allow for
mobile communication but not internet use. But if such technology does not generate similar
responses, it is more likely that our 3G variable captures the local internet infrastructure
rather than another unobserved characteristic.
We follow the structure of Table 3 but now also include 2G coverage as a placebo
treatment. Appendix Table 7 illustrates that, in contrast to the effect of 3G, 2G has
no consistent impact on our outcomes when it is interacted with epidemic exposure. These
results suggest that 3G infrastructure and the mobile internet it enables is the infrastructure
relevant in this context and that it is unlikely to be picking up the effects of an omitted
variable.
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6.7. Ruling out influential treatments
We rule out the importance of influential treatments by excluding one treatment country at
a time.18 This means we turn off the treatment for a specific country where it is assumed not
to have been exposed to an epidemic at all. Appendix Table 8 shows that our coefficient
estimates are stable when one country after another is iteratively eliminated from our main
treatment.
We repeat a similar analysis with Appendix Table 9 but drop one country at a time
(with all its observations in our sample) in each estimation for 10 consecutive trials. Again
we find that the estimates are not driven by a single country.
7. Conclusion
We have documented the tendency for individuals to turn to online and mobile banking when
exposed to an epidemic. The effects do not seem to reflect a change in the volume of financial
transactions, only their form. Intuitively, one should see the substitution of electronic for
person-to-person transactions in an environment where personal contact becomes riskier. It
is less obvious that one should observe an increase (or reduction) in the overall volume of such
transactions (something that we do not observe here). The effect is greatest among young,
economically well-off individuals who reside in areas with good internet infrastructure and
coverage, not surprisingly since such individuals tend to be early adopters with favourable
access to new digital technologies.
The COVID-19 pandemic has been felt unevenly: the poorer portion of populations has
disproportionately suffered its economic and health effects, and women have been dispro-
portionately affected economically in many countries. 3G coverage is another instance of
the same phenomenon: coverage tends to arrive late in poor, rural and remote areas and in
relatively poor neighborhoods in advanced countries, offering their residents less scope for
substituting digital for in-person banking. Digital technology enables individuals to main-
tain customary levels of banking and financial activity while limiting epidemic risks to their
health, but only if the necessary infrastructure is rolled out in a manner that encompasses
poorer, more remote regions.
18For this purpose, we focus only on those countries that drive our contemporaneous treatment variable.
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Appendix Figure 1: 3G Mobile Internet Expansion Around the World  
 
 Panel A: Between 2011 and 2014 
 
 
Panel B: Between 2014 and 2017 
 
Note: Figures illustrate the 3G mobile internet signal coverage at a 1-by-1 kilometer grid level. Source: Collins 










Appendix Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
 (1) 
Variables Mean (Standard deviation) 
Main dependent variables  
Online/Mobile transaction using the internet and bank account 0.083 (0.275) – N: 157,093 
Mobile transaction using bank account 0.094 (0.293) – N: 230,326 
Online payments (such as bills) using the internet 0.197 (0.398) – N: 164,465 
Withdrawals using ATM 0.633 (0.481) – N: 83,309 
Withdrawals using a bank branch 0.309 (0.462) – N: 83,309 
  
Placebo outcomes  
Account ownership 0.568 (0.495) – N: 254,832 
Deposit money into a personal account in a typical month 0.931 (0.251) – N: 94,316 
Withdraw money out of a personal account in a typical month 0.937 (0.241) – N: 94,107 
Debit card ownership 0.409 (0.491) – N: 253,284 
Credit card ownership 0.192 (0.394) – N: 252,624 
  
Pandemic occurrence  0.025 (0.157) 
  
3G coverage characteristics  
Continuous 3G coverage 0.404 (0.391) 
3G coverage in 2011 0.240 (0.308) 
Notes: Means (standard deviations). This table provides individual and aggregate level variables averaged 
across the 3 years (2011, 2014 and 2017) used in the analysis. The sample sizes for some variables are 
















Notes: Results use the Findex-Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and 
reported in parentheses. We check whether our inference is robust to corrections that account for testing of multiple 
hypotheses by adjusting the p-values using the “sharpened q-value approach” and report them in brackets (in terms of 
interpretation, for example, a q-value of one percent means that one percent of significant results will result in false 
positives).  Source: Gallup-Findex, (2011, 2014, 2017) and Ma et al. (2020) Epidemics Database. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Appendix Table 2: The Impact of an Epidemic Year on Financial Technology Adoption by Epidemic Intensity 
 (1) 
Outcome ➔ Online/Mobile transaction using the internet and bank account 
High Exposure to Epidemic  0.119*** 
 (0.037) [0.002] 
Low Exposure to Epidemic  0.085*** 
 (0.018) [0.000] 
  
Observations 157,093 
Outcome ➔  Mobile transaction using bank account 
High Exposure to Epidemic  0.039** 
 (0.015) [0.013] 
Low Exposure to Epidemic  0.053* 
 (0.029) [0.071] 
  
Observations 230,327 
Outcome ➔ Online payments (such as bills) using the internet 
High Exposure to Epidemic  0.078** 
 (0.030) [0.010] 
Low Exposure to Epidemic  -0.003 
 (0.009) [0.775] 
  
Observations 164,465 
Outcome ➔ Withdrawals using ATM 
High Exposure to Epidemic  0.220*** 
 (0.040) [0.000] 
Low Exposure to Epidemic  0.086*** 
 (0.012) [0.000] 
  
Observations 83,322 
Outcome ➔ Withdrawals using a bank branch 
High Exposure to Epidemic  -0.262*** 
 (0.053) [0.000] 
Low Exposure to Epidemic  -0.101*** 
 (0.011) [0.000] 
  
Observations 83,322 
Country fixed effects No 
Year fixed effects  Yes 
Demographic characteristics Yes 
Education fixed effects  No 
Labour market controls No 
Income decile fixed effects No 
Country-level controls Yes 
Country*Education fixed effects Yes 
Country*Labour mar. fixed effects Yes 
Country*Income decile fixed effects Yes 
5 
 
Notes: Results use the Findex-Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered (unless otherwise stated) at the country 
level and reported in parentheses. Source: Gallup-Findex, (2011, 2014, 2017) and Ma et al. (2020) Epidemics Database. * significant at 








Appendix Table 3: The Impact of an Epidemic Year on Financial Technology Adoption – Alternative clustering and time trends 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Robustness ➔  Clustering at the Global 
Region-Year Level  
(12 regions*3 years) 
Clustering at the Global 





Outcome ➔ Online/Mobile trans. using the internet and bank account    
Exposure to Epidemic  0.106*** 0.106* 0.092*** 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.001) 
    
Observations 157,093 157,093 157,093 
Outcome ➔  Mobile transaction using bank account   
Exposure to Epidemic  0.045 0.045 0.035** 
 (0.037) (0.030) (0.010) 
    
Observations 230,326 230,326 230,327 
Outcome ➔ Online payments (such as bills) using the internet   
Exposure to Epidemic  0.049*** 0.049* 0.026*** 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.001) 
    
Observations 164,465 164,465 164,465 
Outcome ➔ Withdrawals using ATM   
Exposure to Epidemic  0.200*** 0.200*** 0.191*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.007) 
    
Observations 83,309 83,309 83,322 
Outcome ➔ Withdrawals using a bank branch   
Exposure to Epidemic  -0.238*** -0.238*** -0.137*** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.007) 
    
Observations 83,309 83,309 83,322 
Country fixed effects No No No 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Education fixed effects  No No No 
Labour market controls No No No 
Income decile fixed effects No No No 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Education fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Labour mar. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Income decile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
6 
 
Notes: Results use the Findex-Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered (unless otherwise stated) 
at the country level and reported in parentheses. Source: Gallup-Findex, (2011, 2014, 2017) and Ma et al. (2020) 










Appendix Table 4: The Impact of an Epidemic Year on Financial Technology Adoption – Placebo Treatments 
 (1) (2) 
Placebo treatment ➔  Randomising epidemics 
across the same-continent 
countries but with the 
original epidemic year 
Randomising epidemics 
across the same-
continent countries and 
across years 
Outcome ➔ Online/Mobile trans. using the internet and bank account   
Placebo treatment -0.019 -0.073 
 (0.072) (0.073) 
   
Observations 157,093 157,093 
Outcome ➔  Mobile transaction using bank account   
Placebo treatment 0.010 -0.022 
 (0.048) (0.044) 
   
Observations 230,326 230,326 
Outcome ➔ Online payments (such as bills) using the internet   
Placebo treatment 0.001 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
   
Observations 164,465 164,465 
Outcome ➔ Withdrawals using ATM   
Placebo treatment 0.002 -0.034 
 (0.025) (0.027) 
   
Observations 83,309 83,309 
Outcome ➔ Withdrawals using a bank branch   
Placebo treatment -0.020 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
   
Observations 83,309 83,309 
Country fixed effects No No 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes 
Education fixed effects  No No 
Labour market controls No No 
Income decile fixed effects No No 
Country-level controls Yes Yes 
Country*Education fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country*Labour mar. fixed effects Yes Yes 
Country*Income decile fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Source: World Bank and Ma et al. (2020) Epidemics Database. Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns 1 and 2 present results from a country-year level 
analysis between 2000 and 2017 (18 years*145 countries=2,610 country-year observations). Columns 3 and 4 present results 
from a country-year level analysis for Findex years 2011, 2014 and 2017 (3 years*145 countries=435 country-year 
observations). Income group refers to the World Banks’s income classification, which assigns the world's economies to four 
income groups—low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries. To obtain a balance sample, missing 
observations in some countries were imputed using own country sample averages. Account at a formal financial inst. (% age 
15+) and ATMs per 100,000 adults capture financial access, Financial system deposits to GDP (%), Private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP (%), and Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) capture financial depth, Bank net interest margin (%) 
and Bank overhead costs to total assets (%) capture financial efficiency, Bank Z-score captures the probability of default of a 
country's commercial banking system, Lerner index captures market power in the banking market. It compares output pricing 





Appendix Table 5: Balance Test – Country-level characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample period ➔  2000-2017 2000-2017 2011, 2014, 2017 2011, 2014, 2017 







     
GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) (log) -0.043 -0.008 0.029 0.026 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.106) (0.120) 
Urban population as a share of total pop. (log) -0.019 0.088 0.090 0.110 
 (0.078) (0.055) (0.279) (0.269) 
Account at a formal financial inst. (% age 15+) (log) 0.009 0.018 0.014 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.029) 
ATMs per 100,000 adults (log) -0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.022) 
Financial system deposits to GDP (%) (log) -0.035 -0.025 0.112 0.099 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.103) (0.095) 
Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) (log) 0.013 0.022 -0.054 -0.046 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.061) (0.056) 
Bank net interest margin (%) (log) 0.014 0.006 -0.017 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.029) (0.031) 
Bank overhead costs to total assets (%) (log) -0.016 -0.010 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.019) 
Bank Z-score -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lerner index -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 2,610 2,610 435 435 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continent by year fixed effects  No Yes No Yes 
Country income group fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
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Source: World Bank and Ma et al. (2020) Epidemics Database. Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Columns 1 and 2 present results from a country-year level 
analysis between 2000 and 2017 (18 years*145 countries=2,610 country-year observations). All explanatory variables in 
Columns 1 and 2 are based on changes between 2000 and 2017 (not in levels). Columns 3 and 4 present results from a 
country-year level analysis between 2011 and 2017 (7 years*145 countries=1,015 country-year observations), in which all 
explanatory variables are measured in 2011. Income group refers to the World Banks’s income classification, which assigns 
the world's economies to four income groups—low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries. To obtain a 
balance sample, missing observations in some countries were imputed using own country sample averages. Account at a 
formal financial inst. (% age 15+) and ATMs per 100,000 adults capture financial access, Financial system deposits to GDP 
(%), Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%), and Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) capture financial 
depth, Bank net interest margin (%) and Bank overhead costs to total assets (%) capture financial efficiency, Bank Z-score 
captures the probability of default of a country's commercial banking system, Lerner index captures market power in the 
banking market. It compares output pricing and marginal costs (that is, markup). An increase in the Lerner index indicates 





Appendix Table 6: Balance Test – Country-level characteristics 

























     
∆ in GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) (log) 0.004 0.061 0.014 0.001 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.024) (0.079) 
∆ in Urban population as a share of total pop. (log) 0.341 0.132 0.045 0.053 
 (0.263) (0.165) (0.032) (0.045) 
∆ in Account at a formal financial inst. (% age 15+) (log) 0.025 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.059) (0.054) (0.008) (0.023) 
∆ in ATMs per 100,000 adults (log) 0.035 0.015 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.021) (0.009) 
∆ in Financial system deposits to GDP (%) (log) 0.051 0.009 -0.032 -0.075 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.022) (0.045) 
∆ in Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) (log) -0.016 0.002 0.028 0.032 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.020) 
∆ in Bank net interest margin (%) (log) 0.010 -0.024 0.061 0.045 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.060) (0.059) 
∆ in Bank overhead costs to total assets (%) (log) 0.019 0.030 0.001 -0.069 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.013) (0.059) 
∆ in Bank Z-score 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
∆ in Lerner index 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Observations 2,610 2,610 1,015 1,015 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Appendix Table 7: The Impact of an Epidemic Year on Financial Technology Adoption and Access – 2G Coverage as a Placebo Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome ➔ Online/Mobile transaction using the internet and bank account 
       
Exposure to Epidemic*3G  0.283*** 0.296*** 0.294*** 0.322*** 0.343*** 0.341*** 
 (0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.044) (0.045) (0.053) 
3G  0.050** 0.035 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.011) 
Exposure to Epidemic*2G   0.013 0.006 -0.002 -0.021 -0.026 -0.038** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) 
2G  -0.020 -0.021 -0.017 -0.014 -0.012 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) 
Exposure to Epidemic 0.079** 0.082** 0.089*** 0.160** 0.162*** -- 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.061) (0.060)  
Observations 127,184 127,184 127,184 127,184 127,184 127,184 
Exp. to Epidemic*Above median 3G 0.288*** 0.226*** 0.239*** 0.237*** 0.164*** 0.162*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) 
Above median 3G 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) 
Exp. to Epidemic*Above median 2G   0.031 0.026 0.018 0.004 0.000 -0.006 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.032) 
Above median 2G -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 0.014 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) 
Exposure to Epidemic 0.073* 0.074* 0.080** 0.147** 0.148** -- 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.060) (0.059)  
Observations 127,184 127,184 127,184 127,184 127,184 127,184 
Exposure to Epidemic*3G(2011)  0.234*** 0.261*** 0.258*** 0.261*** 0.283*** 0.289*** 
 (0.087) (0.080) (0.089) (0.090) (0.094) (0.093) 
3G(2011) 0.078*** 0.052*** 0.029** 0.028** 0.021 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) 
Exposure to Epidemic*2G(2011)    0.040* 0.034 0.026 0.005 -0.004 -0.014 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
2G(2011) -0.023 -0.026* -0.021 -0.020 -0.018 0.009 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Exposure to Epidemic 0.052* 0.055* 0.061* 0.150** 0.154*** -- 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.059) (0.058)  
Observations 95,745 95,745 95,745 95,745 95,745 95,745 
Notes: In terms of control variables, columns are structured as in Table 3. Results use the Findex-Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. We 
check whether our inference is robust to corrections that account for testing of multiple hypotheses by adjusting the p-values using the “sharpened q-value approach” and report them in 
brackets (in terms of interpretation, for example, a q-value of one percent means that one percent of significant results will result in false positives).  Oster's delta indicates the degree of 
selection on unobservables relative to observables that would be needed to fully explain the results by omitted variable bias. Delta values greater than 1 indicate that the results are not driven 
by unobservables. Source: Gallup-Findex, (2011, 2014, 2017), Ma et al. (2020) Epidemics Database and Collins Bartholomew’s Mobile Coverage Explorer. * significant at 10%; ** 




































using a bank 
branch 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Guinea 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Italy  0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Liberia 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Mali 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Nigeria 0.113*** 0.044** 0.020 0.082*** -0.084*** 
 (0.037) [0.003] (0.019) [0.018] (0.020) [0.332] (0.012) [0.000] (0.014) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Senegal 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.220*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.041) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Sierra L. 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. Spain 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. UK 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – excl. USA 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Country fixed effects No No No No No 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education fixed effects  No No No No No 
Labour market controls No No No No No 
Income decile fixed effects No No No No No 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Education fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Labour mar. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Income decile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Results use the Findex-Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in 






































using a bank 
branch 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Guinea 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 156,402 229,579 163,732 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Italy  0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.017) [0.010] (0.030) [0.105] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 156,173 229,156 163,537 82,655 82,655 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Liberia 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.050 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.043) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Mali 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.223*** -0.270*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.038) [0.000] (0.045) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,326 164,465 83,108 83,108 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Nigeria 0.114*** 0.051*** 0.050 0.083*** -0.086*** 
 (0.037) [0.003] (0.019) [0.009] (0.043) [0.249] (0.012) [0.000] (0.014) [0.000] 
Observations 155,523 227,889 162,846 82,478 82,478 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Senegal 0.088*** 0.044*** 0.021 0.220*** -0.262*** 
 (0.018) [0.001] (0.018) [0.018] (0.020) [0.290] (0.040) [0.000] (0.053) [0.000] 
Observations 155,453 227,741 162,797 83,050 83,050 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Sierra L. 0.106*** 0.054*** 0.078** 0.220*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.019) [0.005] (0.030) [0.010] (0.040) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 227,766 162,774 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop Spain 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,093 230,271 164,465 82,455 82,455 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop UK 0.106*** 0.045*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.015) [0.003] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 156,200 229,433 163,567 83,309 83,309 
Exposure to Epidemic – drop USA 0.106*** 0.035*** 0.049 0.200*** -0.238*** 
 (0.030) [0.001] (0.010) [0.001] (0.030) [0.104] (0.046) [0.000] (0.059) [0.000] 
Observations 157,245 229,397 163,610 82,505 82,505 
Country fixed effects No No No No No 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education fixed effects  No No No No No 
Labour market controls No No No No No 
Income decile fixed effects No No No No No 
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Education fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Labour mar. fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country*Income decile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Results use the Findex-Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Online Appendix B 
 
 
Full List of Epidemics from the Ma et al. (2020) Dataset 
Country Year of the epidemic 
Afghanistan 2009 
Albania 2009 
Algeria 2009, 2012 
Angola 2009 
Argentina 2009, 2016 
Armenia 2009 
Australia 2003, 2009 










Bolivia 2009, 2016 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 
Botswana 2009 
Brazil 2009, 2016 





Canada 2003, 2009, 2016 
Cape Verde 2009 
Chad 2009 
Chile 2009, 2016 
China 2003, 2009, 2012 
Colombia 2009, 2016 
Congo Brazzaville 2009 
Congo Kinshasa 2009 
Costa Rica 2009, 2016 
Croatia 2009 
Cuba 2009 




Dominican Republic 2009 
Ecuador 2009, 2016 
Egypt 2009, 2012 





France 2003, 2009, 2012 
Gabon 2009 
Georgia 2009 
Germany 2003, 2009, 2012 
Ghana 2009 
Greece 2009, 2012 
Guatemala 2009, 2016 
Guinea 2014 
Guyana 2009, 2016 
Haiti 2016 
Honduras 2009, 2016 
Hong Kong 2003 
Hungary 2009 
Iceland 2009 
India 2003, 2009 




Ireland 2003, 2009 
Israel 2009 
Italy 2003, 2009, 2012, 2014 
Ivory Coast 2009 
Jamaica 2009, 2016 
Japan 2009 
Jordan 2009, 2012 
Kazakhstan 2009 
Kenya 2009 
Kuwait 2003, 2009, 2012 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 2009 








China, Macao SAR 2003 
Macedonia, FYR 2009 
Madagascar 2009 
Malawi 2009 
Malaysia 2003, 2009, 2012 












Netherlands 2009, 2012 
New Zealand 2003, 2009 
Nicaragua 2009, 2016 
Nigeria 2009, 2014 
Cyprus (Greek) 2009 
Norway 2009 
Oman 2009, 2012 
Pakistan 2009 
Palestine 2009 
Panama 2009, 2016 
Papua New Guinea 2009 
Paraguay 2009, 2016 
Peru 2009, 2016 
Philippines 2003, 2009, 2012 
Poland 2009 
Portugal 2009 
Puerto Rico 2009, 2016 
Qatar 2009, 2012 
Romania 2003, 2009 
Russia 2003, 2009 
Rwanda 2009 




Sierra Leone 2014 
Singapore 2003, 2009 
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Slovak Republic 2009 
Slovenia 2009 
Solomon Islands 2009 
South Africa 2003, 2009 
South Korea 2003, 2009, 2012 
Spain 2003, 2009, 2014 
Sri Lanka 2009 
Sudan 2009 
Suriname 2009, 2016 
Swaziland 2009 
Sweden 2003 
Switzerland 2003, 2009 
Syrian Arab Republic 2009 




Thailand 2003, 2009, 2012 
Trinidad and Tobago 2009, 2016 
Tunisia 2009 
Tunisia 2012 
Turkey 2009, 2012 
Uganda 2009 
Ukraine 2009 
United Arab Emirates 2009, 2012 
United Kingdom 2003, 2009, 2012, 2014 
United States 2003, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016 
Uruguay 2009, 2016 
Venezuela 2009, 2016 
Vietnam 2003, 2009 
Yemen 2009, 2012 
Zambia 2009 
Zimbabwe 2009 
 
